Copyright
November 11, 2026
By Emily Poler
Last week, I moderated a panel discussion titled Litigation Update on the Music Front, at the New York State Bar Association’s Entertainment, Arts & Sports Law Section Fall Meeting 2026, Music Business and Law Conference (That’s a mouthful, eh?). It was my first time moderating a panel like this and stay tuned, because I’m going to try to do this more.
Our four illustrious panelists analyzed developments and decisions in high profile cases with implications for copyright infringement cases across all media. I’ve written about some of these here before, and it was fascinating to hear other attorneys’ perspectives on these very significant lawsuits. Here are some highlights (Alert: It’s longer than my usual posts, but I’d like to think it’s worth a few extra minutes reading time)
Lindsay Korotkin of ArentFox Schiff LLP started the panel off with a look at the Supreme Court’s 9-0 decision in Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment, which reversed a $1 billion verdict against Cox for the internet service provider’s failure to prevent subscribers from sharing pirated copies of Sony-owned media over Cox’s network. Lindsay explained how SCOTUS’ decision will significantly limit copyright owner’s ability to hold ISPs liable for contributory negligence. According to Korotkin, the only way an ISP can be found liable is if it “intended that its service be used for infringement,” she said. “One of the big takeaways is paying attention to how things are being marketed and advertised,” as in the current Disney Enterprises, Inc. et al. v. MiniMax et al, (which I wrote about here), where MiniMax’s Hailuo AI video generator was advertised with images of copyrighted characters and the tagline “A Hollywood Studio in Your Pocket.”
Next, Joshua Graubart of Spencer West discussed Vetter vs. Resnik, a dispute between a songwriter and the company that owned some of his music publishing. The lower court’s opinion in favor of the plaintiff, which the Fifth Circuit affirmed, “shocked a lot of people,” Graubart said. Long story short, the District Court and the Fifth Circuit concluded that an artist exercising termination rights (which you can find out more about here) in the US extends worldwide because all of that artist’s copyrights flow from the US rights. That’s the shocking part because until this case almost everyone assumed that termination rights only applied domestically. For now, the Fifth Circuit’s decision is going to stand because the Supreme Court declined to take the case. Why? Apparently because four justices recused themselves, leaving SCOTUS without a quorum. The four justices didn’t explain their motives, but Graubart says the leading theory is that all have publishing contracts with Penguin Random House, a sister company of BMG. And thus, Graubart asks, “can BMG go to the Supreme Court on anything?”
Remember the Kat Von D case (if you don’t, fear not, you can catch up here)? That’s where photographer Jeff Sedlik sued the celebrity tattoo artist over inking a dupe of his portrait of Miles Davis on a friend’s arm while posting the process on Instagram. Our panel’s Nancy Wolff of Cowan DeBacts, Abrahams and Sheppard LLP covered that one, in which the District Court denied Sedlik’s motion for summary judgment and the jury found against him, concluding the works weren’t similar in their overall “total concept and feel” (the so-called “intrinsic test”). This seemed crazy to anyone who looked at the two images! “There’s complete unpredictability with the intrinsic tests,” said Wolff, which she explained often are based on a jury’s emotions: “It could have been that they thought [Sedlik] was maybe annoying, and [Kat Von D] was a really cool celebrity tattoo artist, and they didn’t want her to be sued. And then to make it worse, it’s completely unreviewable.” Which is one reason why summary judgment, in which a judge presumably takes a more common sense view, is so critical to creators. Another reason: “If you generally can’t win on summary judgment, a case will settle because it is just so expensive to have a jury trial,” Wolff said. Sedlik subsequently appealed the summary judgment denial before the Ninth Circuit, but that Court’s three-judge panel declined to review. And so Sedlik appealed for an en banc review, a rare event in which all 11 Ninth Circuit judges considered his case in September.
Last, but certainly not least, Felicity Kohn of Pryor Cashman, took on the case of Allen v. Perlmutter, which I wrote about here. To me, this was the most interesting case of the day. In summary, Jason Allen created an image in Midjourney AI and the US Copyright Office denied his attempt to register a copyright in that work, finding it lacked the “traditional elements of authorship” because Allen was basically contributing ideas (not protectable), and did not control “expression” of the final work (protectable). Kohn talked about how after reading Allen’s brief, in which he described how he selected the scene, the elements, and the tone, and then refined the generated image over 600 times to get the output he wanted, she felt there was enough human intervention to qualify for copyright protection. But then Kohn read the US Copyright Office’s brief, and was surprised to have her mind changed. (I had the same reaction!) “Although he honestly revised the image using Photoshop and upscaling software,” Kohn said, “the Midjourney output indisputably remained part of the work.” Kohn was especially impressed by an example the Copyright Office pointed to, where the prompt “white bunny with low ears, rainbow background, love, cute, happy” produced four entirely different looking bunnies (and only one with low ears), illustrating, in Kohn’s opinion, “how much of this comes from Midjourney and not from Allen. If the same prompt can result in such vastly differing expressions, the prompter then can’t be the one to translate the idea into expression. And that’s why he can’t be the author.”
October 13, 2026
By Emily Poler
One thing I find sooooo satisfying is a copyright case where the judge starts by saying, “hey, yeah, the litigants are asking us to figure out infringement related to new technology, but no matter the fancy-sounding jargon you’re throwing at me and what you claim are the earth-shattering stakes, this is JUST a copyright case. And I’m going to apply copyright law the same as I would if you brought a copyright case involving an old-fashioned book.”
Ok, it’s not a direct quote, but it’s the gist. So why does this get me so excited? Regardless of what I think of the outcome of a case, and as much as I like diving into new tech, for me, what I really love about being a lawyer and a litigator is reasoning by analogy. And, in the Third Circuit’s recent decision in Thomson Reuters Enterprise Centre GmbH v. ROSS Intelligence, Inc., (which I first wrote about here) the Third Circuit gave me what I love. “Under ROSS’s framing, this case appears to concern the future of AI legal technology. But appearances can be deceiving. In truth, this is no more than an ordinary copyright case,” said Judge Tamika Montgomery-Reeves.
For those of you who aren’t lawyers, we use a Thomson Reuters product called Westlaw for legal research. One of the things that, IMHO, makes Westlaw so useful is its West Key Number System, which is more or less like the Dewey Decimal System (without, at least as far as I know, the racism and misogyny of Melvil Dewey). The system organizes United States law into a structure of topics and key numbers that lawyers use to find cases relevant to specific legal issues and look for other cases that address the same issues. Most cases on Westlaw include a short summary called a headnote, which are generated by Westlaw editors.
ROSS Intelligence was (it no longer exists) a Westlaw competitor that “created an AI legal search engine that would respond to plain-language legal questions with relevant passages of text from judicial opinions.” To build this, ROSS hired a company to create training data for its AI, which consisted of questions and answers called “Bulk Memos.” Those Bulk Memos were based on — and quoted directly from — Westlaw’s headnotes. ROSS clearly intended its product to be a substitute for Westlaw; it even ran ads comparing its product to the Thomson Reuters database.
Not surprisingly, Thomson Reuters was none too happy about all this and sued ROSS. In response, ROSS claimed that Westlaw’s headnotes were not subject to copyright protection. It also argued its use of headnotes was an “intermediate” step and referenced a line of cases finding copying of computer code at an intermediate step to be fair use, where such copying was necessary to access purely functional elements of a computer program.
After some back and forth, the District Court found that headnotes were sufficiently original to be copyrighted. It also denied ROSS’s claim of fair use, noting that ROSS was not copying computer code. Late last month, the Third Circuit affirmed this holding.
It’s something of a landmark decision, since by my count it is the first case involving an AI platform to be decided by a Federal Appellate Court. And there are a couple of things especially noteworthy about the Court’s conclusions.
First, since ROSS’s end use — to assist with legal research — was the same as Westlaw’s, the Third Circuit found that ROSS’s use wasn’t particularly transformative, which weighed against a finding of fair use. The Court was also not particularly impressed with ROSS’s reliance on precedent that “intermediate” copying of computer code was fair use because, in contrast to those previous cases, ROSS didn’t NEED to copy the materials. ROSS simply chose to do it because it was the easiest way to train its AI. In addition, ROSS copied headnotes and not computer code.
The Third Circuit also found that, even though Thomson Reuters hadn’t yet licensed its headnotes, ROSS’s conduct could harm the potential market for Thomson Reuters to do so. (When considering fair use courts look at the impact on the potential market for the work being infringed.) This is interesting because earlier this year, the judge in the Meta copyright case found that this factor weighed in favor of fair use because the plaintiffs (authors, in that case) hadn’t presented evidence of harm to the licensing market. Obviously, the Third Circuit saw things differently.
What does Thomson Reuters’ victory mean for other AI-related copyright cases going forward? In my view, its impact may be limited because the use at issue here is so specific, and ROSS’s product was clearly directly competitive with Westlaw. In contrast, the LLMs at issue in cases involving Meta and Anthropic can be used for a wider range of tasks. For example, if an author’s novel is ingested into an LLM that is used to create materials that are not novels — say, an email to opposing counsel — the new use is less clearly competitive. Nonetheless, the ROSS case represents another step in the ongoing journey of AI through the courts, the epic saga of our legal (and cultural) times that we will continue to watch with bated breath.
September 29, 2026
By Emily Poler
Most copyright disputes you hear about — and most that I write about — question whether a work has been infringed or whether an infringement constitutes fair use. But that’s not every case! There are pretty interesting and obscure provisions in the Copyright Act that sometimes come into play, like that at the crux of a current lawsuit brought by old-school hip-hop artists Salt-N-Pepa against the record label that owns the music from their golden age as the First Ladies of Rap.
This provision, section 203 of the Copyright Act, allows artists to reclaim their copyrights and/or sound recordings from an entity to whom they transferred ownership after 35 years. The thinking behind it is that throughout the history of pop music, artists often got screwed when they signed their first contracts because they had less bargaining power than they eventually gained after becoming successful (and having the wherewithal and cash to hire attorneys). Imagine the difference, say, in Dolly Parton’s ability to favorably negotiate her first record deal when she was an unknown teenager from eastern Tennessee versus the imperial powers the Queen of Country wielded at the time of her death (RIP Dolly 😢).
That said, this right of reclamation only exists where there was (a) a grant of a transfer or license of copyright, and (b) that grant was executed by the author. Notably, the statute specifically says this right to terminate a transfer or license does not apply to works for hire. This makes sense because when someone creates something as a work for hire, that person isn’t legally the author of the work; the company they work for is.
And all that is the problem for Salt-N-Pepa. In 1986, the group’s members, which include Cheryl James (Salt) and Sandra Denton (Pepa), entered into a couple of agreements with Noise in the Attic Productions, Inc. (NITA), a company owned by their producer and manager Hurby Azor. (As an aside, shout-out to the third member of the group, Deidra Roper a/k/a Spinderella, their DJ, who is not involved in the case. But we should never forget Spinderella.) That contract names NITA as the “sole and exclusive owner” of the master recordings and all copyrights. Azor subsequently assigned those rights to the Next Plateau Records label in an agreement that James and Denton were not signatories to (the pair only signed an attached “inducement letter”). The years went by, record labels were bought and sold, the industry consolidated and today, the rights to the four albums Salt-n-Pepa recorded between 1986 and 1993 are owned by entertainment behemoth Universal Music Group (UMG).
James and Denton now say that those agreements are subject to termination under the Copyright Act. In keeping with this, in 2022 they served UMG with notices of termination. UMG responded saying the 1986 agreements did not amount to a transfer of copyright based on how those original agreements were structured, and that Salt-N-Pepa’s recordings for NITA were also works for hire. Either way, says UMG, James and Denton weren’t eligible to get their copyrights back.
As will surprise no one who reads this blog, James and Denton filed suit. However, the District Court judge agreed with UMG and dismissed the case. In her dismissal, the judge wrote “the 1986 agreements do not indicate that Plaintiffs ever owned the copyrights to the sound recordings or that they granted a transfer of those rights to anyone else.” Basically, the judge determined that the only assignment of ownership was NITA’s transfer to Next Plateau and no contract James and Denton executed indicated otherwise. Crucially, the judge said that James and Denton had failed to expressly assert copyright ownership in their original agreement with NITA. Thus, according to the judge, James and Denton never held any copyrights in the work they created. While the judge didn’t issue a decision on whether the recordings were works for hire, she did note that the original copyright registrations described NITA as “employer for hire.”
Last week, the Second Circuit heard the appeal of this matter. Salt-n-Pepa’s attorneys argued that the 1986 agreements they signed with their producer transferred rights that are subject to the Copyright Act’s termination section. They also argued that the District Court judge erred by insisting that artists expressly assert copyright ownership in their contracts. According to Salt-n-Pepa’s attorneys, by doing so the judge invented a “new requirement out of whole cloth” where the Copyright Act has no such rule.
UMG, for its part, said that the 1986 agreements were clear that Salt-n-Pepa hadn’t granted or licensed their copyrights to their producer. Therefore, according to Universal, there was no agreement to be terminated under Section 203 of the Copyright Act.
As with all things litigation, we’ll have to wait and see where the Second Circuit comes out. If I had to guess, I’d say that there’s a chance the Second Circuit reverses the District Court’s opinion, but not because the District Court’s conclusion was necessarily wrong. Rather, I think the Second Circuit may find that the 1986 contracts are a bit of a mess and, therefore, the case shouldn’t have been dismissed at a very preliminary stage.
While this gets sorted, we can all kick back and bop down memory lane to Salt-N-Pepa classics like Push It, Shoop, Whatta Man, or Let’s Talk About Sex, right? NOPE! UMG has removed the old albums from streaming platforms, claiming the question of who could license the music was unresolved; James and Denton allege the action is retaliation against their efforts to reclaim their work. So if you want to hear the original hits, you’ll have to dig out your old CDs. Assuming you still have something to play them on; if not, ask your kid, because apparently CD players are back in vogue among Gens Z and A.
August 10, 2026
By Emily Poler
These two images of Miles Davis look pretty similar, eh?

The question is, does the one on the right — a tattoo inked by reality TV star Katherine von Drachenberg (a/k/a Kat Von D) — infringe on the original, copyrighted photo taken by Jeff Sedlik in 1989?
According to the 9th Circuit, which affirmed a jury’s finding earlier this year, the answer is no. But that’s where things get interesting (at least for copyright nerds like us). Two of the three judges who affirmed the jury’s decision wrote separate, concurring opinions saying, in essence, that based on existing law we have to affirm the jury’s finding of no infringement — but we think that existing law is kinda f’d.
Before I explain their thinking, a little background. When Sedlik took the photo of the famed jazz trumpeter, he made all sorts of creative decisions regarding wardrobe and pose, going so far as to position Davis’ fingers to represent musical notes. He registered the photograph with the U.S. Copyright Office in 1994 and has since sold licenses authorizing limited reproduction, distribution, display, and creation of derivative works; he even once licensed the image for a tattoo. Just not the one pictured above.
In 2021, after Kat Von D inked that on a subject (purportedly tracing the photograph to create a stencil) and then posted pics on social media, Sedlik sued her. And yet, despite what to you and me might seem very obvious similarities between the photo and the tattoo, a jury concluded the tattoo did not constitute copyright infringement. Sedlik appealed, and a panel of three judges declined to overturn the jury’s decision.
That said, two of those judges took issue with the process by which the jury reached their decision. What’s their beef? Taking a step back, to establish infringement, the plaintiff has to show that the defendant unlawfully appropriated the copyrighted work. This requires showing that the two works are “substantially similar.” In the 9th Circuit — which includes California and, naturally, hears more than its share of copyright cases — this is examined through a two-part test. The first part of this test, which is called the extrinsic test and is decided by a judge, is supposed to assess the objective similarities of the two works with a particular focus on only those parts of the copyrighted work that are protectable. (It’s not always easy to separate what’s protectable from what’s not, since copyright protects original expression, and not the underlying concept. Lots of gray area there).
The second part — the intrinsic test — looks “for similarity of expression from the standpoint of the ordinary reasonable observer, with no expert assistance.” This part is, generally, up to a jury.
Copyright infringement requires both of these tests to be satisfied.
In the Kat Von D case, the two judges with the aggressive opinions took issue with the intrinsic test, with one of them writing it is “fundamentally flawed” and “virtually devoid of analysis.” Each judge wrote that the court should consider doing away with it because, in their view, it hands a complicated and ambiguous analysis to a jury with zero guidance. They find this problematic because it leaves decisions up to a jury’s “feel,” which in this case resulted in the jurors seeming to have ignored Sedlik’s protectable expression in his composition of the subject, which Von D clearly copied, instead deciding, “well, one’s a photo and one’s a tattoo so they’re not similar.” This intrinsic test, according to the two judges, does nothing to help jurors distinguish between the protected portions of a work and the unprotected portions and is at odds with Supreme Court precedent that suggests “to accord with the Copyright Act, a court should focus on carefully filtering out [unprotectable] concepts and ideas.”
What’s more, the judges are concerned that appeals courts don’t generally go around second-guessing juries on these types of decisions — which, in effect, gives juries in these cases a ton of power they maybe shouldn’t have. The judges also took issue with the fact that the nature of this test makes it nearly impossible for a plaintiff to win without going to trial, which places a heavy financial burden on anyone who feels they’ve been infringed upon.
Provocative stuff indeed (again, for copyright nerds). So what do I think? Well, the judges definitely make some good points. Infringement analysis can be very difficult for the average citizens on a jury who have no knowledge of the fine points of creative expression. The problem is, they don’t offer up any ideas for what they would put into place instead of the current test. They seem to be suggesting that such determinations would be better decided by judges and/or with the help of expert witnesses. Now, I’m not sure that judges are necessarily any more able than your average juror to determine what is or isn’t protectable, or that having judges make these decisions is going to lead to more predictable and consistent results.
This case is now going to be heard by all of the judges on the 9th Circuit. Maybe they’ll give us some guidance, which would be nice since, ultimately, this case is about how we figure out what is protected by copyright law and who determines this. Which is pretty important.
May 26, 2026
By Emily Poler
In an era where a lot of people have a problem taking responsibility — or, as is more weirdly said nowadays, “accountability” — for their actions and mistakes, institutions and large corporations are no different. Witness Samsung’s shrug of a response to a complaint filed against it earlier this month by pop star Dua Lipa, which essentially boils down to “someone told us what we were doing was OK.”
It’s a pretty simple suit. The Seoul-based electronics manufacturer and its US subsidiary has been selling televisions in boxes adorned with this image of the English entertainer:

According to Ms. Lipa’s complaint, filed in California this month, the photo was taken backstage at the 2024 Austin City Limits Festival and shared in this post on her official Instagram account. The complaint further says that Dua Lipa has a registered copyright in the image, and thus asserts copyright and trademark infringement claims against Samsung, along with violation of Dua Lipa’s right of publicity.
The copyright claims are based on Samsung’s use of a copyrighted image without permission. The trademark claims are based on assertions that, by using her image to market televisions, Samsung is implying that she is endorsing its products. The right of publicity claims are based on Samsung’s use of her extremely valuable image in a commercial setting without permission.
Does this really matter? Well, according to Lipa’s team, shortly after the box appeared her fans began calling it the “Dua Lipa TV Box” on their socials, and the lawsuit cites specific Instagram comments like one user saying they would “get that TV just because Dua is on it,” and “if you need anything selling just put a picture of Dua Lipa on it.”
So yeah, it matters. Naturally, as with any modern celebrity, Ms. Lipa has legitimate sponsorship agreements with brands like Puma, Versace, and Yves Saint Laurent. She does not work with Samsung, and it seems obvious that someone in Dua Lipa’s organization would be aware of whether she gave anyone permission to use her photo on their product packaging.
The complaint goes on to say that Dua Lipa’s lawyers approached Samsung about trying to resolve this matter and Samsung refused, ignoring “repeated demands” to “cease and desist from infringing on her rights.” In other words, shrug, because hey, sue me.
Samsung did eventually issue a statement, saying the photo was “originally provided by a content partner for our free streaming service Samsung TV Plus. The image was used only after receiving explicit assurance from the content partner that permission had been secured, including for the retail boxes. Given this assurance, we deny any allegations of intentional misuse.” So far Samsung has not named that third-party “content partner.”
In my view this is not a great defense. Notably, Samsung doesn’t say “oh, hey, we have this written agreement that lets us use this image.” Nor does it say, “once we found out there was an issue we immediately took steps to correct this problem.” Rather, this sounds an awful lot like a teenager saying, “gosh, my friend’s parents told me I could!” when caught doing something they weren’t supposed to do. (Also, I have a teenager at home, so maybe I’m just seeing everything in terms of how a modern kid might see the world.)
Samsung’s statement goes on: “We have actively sought and remain open to a constructive resolution with Ms. Lipa’s team.” Here’s a suggestion for a constructive resolution: take the darn picture off the boxes when asked instead of (allegedly) ignoring her requests to do so and then claiming you have been assured you have the rights to use the image. Seems simple, no?
All that said, Samsung hasn’t formally answered the complaint yet, so it will be interesting to see what it says when they do. Unless it can explain exactly how it has rights to use the photo at issue, I don’t see this getting a whole lot better for the company, especially because at least some of Dua Lipa’s claims allow her to shift her attorneys’ fees onto Samsung if she prevails, on top of the $15 million her suit is seeking.
But hey, I guess a multinational giant like Samsung can just shrug that off, too.