Employment
October 21, 2025
By Laura Trachtman
Did you ever wonder whether you’d need to revisit the issue of whether slavery still exists in the United States of America in this, the Year of Our Lord 2025, 160 years after the end of the Civil War? If you did, count yourself lucky, Dear Reader, because we have a humdinger of a case, Yeend et al. v. Akima Global Services, which is currently pending in the Western District of New York.
The Plaintiffs are a certified class of noncitizens (ICE’s term) who were or are detained in the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility, which is operated by Akima Global Services ( “AGS”), a for-profit corporation. The Plaintiffs allege that, not only were they forced to work for AGS in violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”), but that, in violation of New York Labor Law and Federal Labor Standards Act, they were paid a whopping $1.00 per day, and that this served to unjustly enrich Defendant.
Defendant moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ claims. On the TVPRA, Defendant claimed that Plaintiffs were not held in involuntary servitude “threatened with or subjected to serious harm or any other coercion,” and Plaintiffs “cannot prove that Defendant knowingly coerced their labor.” WOW is that not an argument I would want to present to the judge. The Court was not impressed with Defendant’s arguments, and noted that Plaintiffs submitted declarations from detainees who claimed they were subject to collective punishment including a housing-unit wide “shakedown” by dozens of Defendant’s officers while Defendant’s supervisory officer claimed that he did not recall the specifics of that event.
Defendant argued that Plaintiffs’ New York State Labor Law and FLSA claims should be dismissed because Plaintiffs were not “employees” and, therefore, not within the protections of those laws. Here, Defendant relied on case law addressing the application of New York State Labor Law to prisoners. In denying the Defendant’s motion, the Court noted that Defendant’s reliance on case law concerning the labor law’s application to prisoners in prisons is not persuasive when it comes to the labor law’s application to detainees in detention centers. Furthermore, the Court cited to Plaintiffs’ argument that:
AGS’s supervision of the V[oluntary] W[ork] P[rogram, wherein a detainee may “volunteer” to work in order to earn money for her or his commissary] clearly evinces the control of an employer. AGS assigns detainees their jobs and determines workers’ shifts. . . . It provides job training to detainee workers. . . . AGS maintains records of which detainees performed which jobs on each day. . . . AGS staff supervise detainee workers to ensure they perform their job adequately and they can fire detainees for poor performance. . . . AGS provides detainees with the materials and supplies they need to perform their jobs. . . . AGS pays detainees by depositing pay directly into workers’ commissary accounts and keeps records of those payments. . . . AGS determined that detainees would be paid $1 per day of work and no more than $5 per week, regardless of the number of hours or days worked. . . . In short, AGS controls all aspects of VWP participants’ job performance, from hiring, training, and supervising to setting pay policies and depositing funds into workers’ accounts.
Finally, the Court addressed Defendant’s motion for summary judgment against Plaintiffs’ claim for unjust enrichment, wherein Plaintiffs essentially argued that Defendant was becoming rich off of Plaintiffs’ slave labor. Defendant argued that Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claims failed because Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that any of their labor directly benefitted Defendant, in part because the Contract did not obligate Defendant to provide various services which detainees performed. The Court found this argument contrary to contemporaneous documents in the Court record, noting specifically that Defendant’s President and corporate representative testified during a deposition that, in essence, that AGS relied on the detainees working in the kitchen to make AGS profitable. Please recall that these detainees were paid $1.00 per day; that’s 12.5 cents per hour for an 8 hour work day, and less if they worked more.
Take a moment to re-read the foregoing paragraph. In other words, these detainees are human beings who are forced to work for ONE DOLLAR A DAY so a corporation can make a profit. Consider that this is happening in America today. (And before you scoff that “this couldn’t ever happen to me – I’m an American citizen!” please be aware that over 170 American citizens have been detained by ICE at raids and protests. Furthermore, United States Army veterans have been injured and arrested at protests against ICE.)
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery or involuntary servitude in the United States, yet detainees, who haven’t been convicted of a crime, are literally forced to work for $1.00 per day so a corporation can make money. If that isn’t involuntary servitude, I don’t know what is.
September 10, 2025
By Laura Trachtman
A former partner at Katten Muchin Rosenman, LLP is suing his prior firm and two of its partners, Noah Heller and Michael Verde, for $67 million dollars, alleging, among other things, age discrimination in firing. This case is just the kind of borderline absurd scandalous legal drama that gives me life, and in three specific areas: discrimination, representation, and arbitration.
First, age discrimination is, IMO, one of the hardest discrimination-based allegations to demonstrate. Courts have held that, unlike other types of discrimination, one of the best ways to demonstrate age-based discrimination is by recounting comments rooted in age-related bigotry. Now, if you’ve ever handled a race-or gender-based discrimination case, you’ll know that most people aren’t stupid enough to make statements about a person’s gender or race. “Well, we’re going to give this position to a white person because we, as white people, feel more comfortable among other white people” or “You, being female, simply aren’t as emotionally stable as a man” are comments that are almost never heard these days, although the sentiments behind them certainly continue to thrive. However, this is not the case in age-based discrimination, as alleged in the 129-page Addendum to the Complaint. “Heller and Verde told me in an in-person meeting to tell me to resign from the firm, the firm and its malpractice insurer concluded that it presented too great a malpractice risk to the firm to allow lawyers close to retirement to continue to handle client relationships,” says Stewart B. Herman, Esq., the plaintiff, who is representing himself. The Addendum also alleged that Katten’s CEO, Heller, previously bragged to Herman that he, the CEO, secured that position by leveraging his youth against those other, older candidates, who are likely to retire more quickly and thus be less invested in the Firm.
This moves us quickly to our next interesting point: Herman is representing himself. This also almost never happens amongst BigLaw attorneys — or attorneys, full stop. Plenty of plaintiffs represent themselves pro se, but they tend to be, in my experience, cuckoo bananas. In fairness, plenty of lawyers are also cuckoo bananas, but that’s another post for another day. It does remind me of a quote from The Addams Family movie, spoken by Gomez Addams, brilliantly portrayed by the late actor Raul Julia: “They say that a man who represents himself has a fool for a client. Well, with God as my witness, I am that fool!” (I’m not calling Herman a fool. I’m just repeating what Gomez said.)
Most recently, in response to a motion filed by Katten to compel arbitration, the Magistrate Judge addressed the parties’ arbitration agreement. While the Court granted the defendant’s motion to stay the matter pending arbitration, in a fascinating twist, the Court admitted that it could not force the parties to go to arbitration: “Although the Court has the power, and obligation, to stay the instant action, it cannot affirmatively order the parties to arbitrate.” This is because the arbitration agreement between Katten and Herman says the arbitration must occur in Chicago, but the Federal Arbitration Act does not allow a court to order parties to arbitration outside of the district in which the court sits. In this instance, that’s the Southern District of New York, which obviously does not include Chicago.
So the parties have several options: agree to arbitrate in New York (which Herman has already declined to agree to), agree to arbitrate in Chicago (ditto), or sit and wait until someone changes their mind or Congress changes the law. I anticipate that Herman will have some soul-searching to do, trapped between the devil and the deep blue sea as he is.
August 27, 2025
By Laura Trachtman
It’s almost football season! Taylor Swift and Travis Kelce got engaged! We have drama associated with claims against the NFL for discrimination! It’s an exciting time to be a football fan.
In a 100-page First Amended Complaint, “on February 1, 2022, Coach Brian Flores—who is now joined by Coach Steve Wilks and Coach Ray Horton—filed this class action lawsuit against the National Football League (“NFL” or the “League”) and its member teams. The suit alleged, and continues to allege, systemic racial discrimination in the hiring, retention and termination of NFL coaches and executives.”
If you didn’t know (and I did not, so I looked it up), Brian Flores was the Head Coach for the Miami Dolphins, Steve Wilks was the Head Coach for the Arizona Cardinals, and Ray Horton was the Defensive Backs Coach for the Washington Redskins. The case’s venue is in the Southern District of New York, which is where the NFL maintains its headquarters, and the causes of action are an interesting mix of federal and state: Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act, New York State Human Rights Law, New York City Human Rights Law, New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, and Florida Private Whistleblower Statute.
(Side Note: I’m always interested in why a plaintiff would ground a discrimination lawsuit in the federal statutes, where the requirements to prove discrimination are so much more stringent than under the New York’s statutes, and there are filing requirements with the EEOC that must be satisfied, but that’s another blog post for another day.)
Moving past my skeptical feelings about how OF COURSE the NFL discriminates against people of color – I didn’t even realize that there were Black head coaches aside from Mike Tomlin, of the Pittsburgh Steelers – some lawyer in Southern California managed to get himself into biiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiig trouble with a District Court Judge in this case. False start, ten yard penalty!
Michael Caspino appeared as attorney for Wilks in January 2025, and then withdrew as Wilks’ counsel in June 2025. Unfortunately, there appear to have been some inconsistencies associated with Mr. Caspino’s Notice of Appearance, which resulted in Judge Valerie E. Caproni issuing the following on June 17, 2025:
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Mr. Caspino is ordered to show cause by July 7, 2025, why the Court should not refer him to the disciplinary panel of this Court to consider whether he should be sanctioned for his conduct. As part of that submission, Mr. Caspino is required to provide a certificate of good standing from each state in which he is a member of the bar and explain, under oath: 1) how he was able to file a Notice of Appearance in the Southern District of New York on ECF despite not being a member of the bar for the Southern District of New York; 2) why his signature block in filings at docket entries 135 and 136 states “Pro Hac Vice Pending” despite the fact that Mr. Caspino never filed a motion to be admitted Pro Hac Vice in the Southern District of New York; 3) why he represented in the notice of appearance that he is “admitted or otherwise authorized to practice in this court” when it appears that it not accurate; 4) why as of June 17, 2025, his website (https://www.pricecaspino.com/michael-caspino) continues to represent falsely that he is a member of the Arizona bar; and 5) unless he has provided a certificate of good standing from the bars of California, Colorado, and Nevada, why, as of June 17, 2025, his website represents he is a member of the bars of those states. If Mr. Caspino fails to provide at least one certificate of good standing from the bar of at least one state, his submission must also address why a criminal referral for the unauthorized practice of law is not appropriate.
TL; DR: Judge Caproni is BIG MAD at Mr. Caspino for his misstatements of fact as to his credentials.
If you thought that the Judge would let it go after Mr. Caspino filed a letter on July 7, 2025, correcting misstatements of fact in his Notice of Appearance (that he had applied for admission in SDNY pro hac vice, which he had not) and on his website that he was admitted to the bars of certain states (AZ, CA, NV and CO, two of which he was no longer a member of), you were wrong. The Judge doubled down on July 9, 2025, with this Order:
ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Mr. Caspino is ordered to explain, under oath, how he was able to file a Notice of Appearance in SDNY on ECF despite not being a member of the SDNY bar and to provide a Certificate of Good Standing from the California Bar by no later than July 31, 2025. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, also not later than July 31, 2025, Mr. Caspino must provide a more complete explanation of how he came to represent falsely that he was “admitted or otherwise authorized to practice in this court;” when it was decided that he would not represent Mr. Wilks in this action; why he thought it appropriate to state that admission pro hac vice was pending when no motion had been made; when his membership in the bars of Nevada and Colorado lapsed; when he was reinstated to the Arizona Bar and proof from the Arizona Bar that he has, in fact, been reinstated; and why he should not be referred to the disciplinary panel of this Court in light of his admitted misrepresentations to the Court.
Mr. Caspino filed another letter on July 31, 2025, providing a Certificate of Good Standing from the CA Bar and a letter from the AZ Bar, but the Judge still didn’t let it go: on August 5, 2025, she entered the following Order.
ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Mr. Caspino is ordered to appear in person for a hearing on August 25, 2025 at 10:30 A.M. in Courtroom 20C of the Daniel Patrick Moynihan Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, New York, New York, 10007 and be prepared to explain under oath: (i) how he obtained ECF filing privileges in this Court without being admitted to practice in this Court; (ii) how he came to represent falsely in the Notice of Appearance that he was admitted or otherwise authorized to practice in this court, Dkt. 135; (iii) when it was decided that he would not represent Mr. Wilks in this action; (iv) why he thought it appropriate to represent that admission pro hac vice was pending when no motion had been made, Dkt. 135, 136; (v) whether he has previously filed notices of appearance in any other court falsely representing that he was admitted or otherwise authorized to practice in this court, even though he was not and, if so, in what cases and in what jurisdictions; and (vi) why he failed to respond fully to either of the orders issued by this Court, Dkts. 138, 140.
Another letter from Mr. Caspino on August 21, 2025, and on August 22, 2025, the Court filed the following Order:
By no later than August 22, 2025 at 12:00 P.M. Pacific Standard Time, Mr. Caspino must provide the Court with the name of the case, case number, the presiding judge, and a copy of the Order scheduling the August 25, 2025 court appearance in Orange County Superior Court that he referenced in his declaration. Mr. Caspino’s declaration makes multiple references stating that he has “voluntarily complied with the Court’s Order” and “voluntarily provided answers,” which suggests that he does not consider that he is subject to the jurisdiction of the Southern District of New York. He is clearly mistaken. The grievance committee of the Southern District of New York may discipline “[a]ny attorney not a member of the bar of this court [who] has appeared at the bar of this court without permission to do so,” Local Civ. R. 1.5(b)(6), and the grievance committee may discipline “any attorney” who, “in connection with activities in this court,” engages in “conduct violative of the New York State Rules of Professional Conduct,” Local Civ. R. 1.5(b)(5).
At this point, this lawsuit has totally deteriorated into a war between this poor schlub from California and the District Court Judge, who is having absolutely none of his nonsense. There hasn’t been a filing related to the merits of this case for literally months; it’s just Caspino and Judge Caproni going at it hammer and tongs.
The latest filings memorialize that Judge Caproni Ordered Caspino to appear on August 25, and he claimed that he had a conflict, so she Ordered him to appear on August 26, and he claimed to have yet another conflict, and she refused to allow him to appear other than in person. He did not appear before her in person on August 26, 2025 at 2:30pm, and so she issued the following Order:
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Mr. Caspino is ordered to show cause why he should not be held in contempt and sanctioned accordingly for his failure to appear at the show cause hearing scheduled for August 26, 2025. By no later than noon EST, August 28, 2025, Mr. Caspino must provide three dates during the last two weeks of September 2025 on which he is available to appear in-person in the Southern District of New York for the show cause hearing. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Mr. Caspino wishes to submit a memorandum of law or other materials in connection with any of the orders to show cause that are pending, including the current order to show cause why he should not be held in contempt and sanctioned accordingly, all such materials must be filed no later than September 12, 2025. SO ORDERED.
And that, my friends, is why you never, ever, ever, ever, mess with a federal judge. Touchdown!
July 1, 2025
By Laura Trachtman
New York State Senator Sean Ryan has introduced another bill banning non-compete agreements in New York. The bill, S4641, has passed the State Senate and is currently before the Assembly. This is the third bill addressing non-competes since 2021. Hopefully, the third time’s the charm.
What are non-compete agreements? Non-compete agreements are agreements between an employee and employer where the employee agrees that, after their employment ends, they may not engage in whatever they’ve been doing for a period of time and in a specific geographic area.
Why are we talking about this? Non-compete agreements are a vital issue in employment law. If you sign an employment contract that has a non-compete provision, you could find yourself bagging groceries at the local supermarket for the next year instead of engaging in whatever work you have specialized in for the past years/decades. (More on that later.)
Why did my employer make me sign this? Your employer has, in theory at least, invested time, energy and money in making you the standout employee you are today, and your employer does not want you to take what you learned at their expense and port it to a competitor.
Is that legal? That’s the question I’m addressing today. Right now, yes, it’s completely legal in certain situations, although they are not nearly as enforceable as people think. The bill above, S4641, wants to change that.
How will the bill change that? S4641 purports to limit non-competes to “highly compensated individuals” – those who are making greater than $500,000 per year. S4641 also states that health related professionals (physician, PA, chiropractor, dentist, etc.) are not subject to non-competes. Lawyers are not excluded. Womp womp.
What happens if the bill is not passed? If the bill isn’t passed or Governor Hochul refuses to sign it, and she has refused to sign previous iterations of a non-compete ban, employees still have the protections of the Courts.
The Courts have already addressed the merits of a non-compete, so I’ll run through this quickly. New York has a strict policy against restraint of trade. “In general, we have strictly applied the rule to limit enforcement of broad restraints on competition.” BDO Seidman v. Hirschberg, 93 NY2d 382, 389 (1999). This makes sense, as there’s a general policy against restraining trade, as trade makes money and the State likes money. However, non-competes restrain trade by preventing qualified individuals from getting new jobs – so how does that work?
It means that Courts will only enforce a non-compete if it is “(1) necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate interests; (2) reasonable in time and area; (3) not unreasonably burdensome to the employee; and (4) nor harmful to the general public” Id., at 388-89. In other words, the employer has to have a really good reason to enforce the non-compete. It also has to be reasonable in time and distance – if you’re working in New York, and you get a job offer in Abu Dhabi, well, enforcing the non-compete is going to be hard for the employer, as Abu Dhabi is rilly rilly far from New York, and the employer will have an uphill battle justifying how a job in Abu Dhabi will endanger the employer’s legitimate interests. The non-compete must also not be unreasonably burdensome to the employee. That means that the employee has to be able to get a job in another area – an employer can’t just expect a person to be unemployed for a year, or bagging groceries, as I referenced above. Finally, the non-compete has to not harm the general public.
My final point today about the Courts and enforcement of non-competes is that the Courts have held that “…the only justification for imposing an employee agreement not to compete is to forestall unfair competition.” Id., at 391. That means that if the employee is going to engage in fair competition, there’s no reason to enforce the non-compete.
Does this mean that the employee always gets out of a non-compete if they can demonstrate that they will only engage in fair competition? No, because there are so many other variables, especially the employee’s risk tolerance; not everyone is interested in damning the torpedoes and going full speed ahead, especially when there’s a better than average chance of landing in court. This is a frustrating situation, especially as one who believes in the Court system, as it can dissuade a qualified and worthy employee from moving forward with their professional endeavors.
And that’s the real reason why New York needs a non-compete ban enacted by the legislature – while employers tend to have the advantage over employees in the Court systems (generally – with access to greater resources, etc.), the situation is different if there’s an actual law against non-competes. And while the $500,000 cap is frustrating for me, as an attorney who represents individuals who earn that much, one hopes that an employee will negotiate either a waiver or a garden leave.
